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Cryptocurrencies (e.g., Bitcoin, EOS, Etherum, Litecoin,  and others) are disrupting the traditional 
banking and financial systems.  The cryptocurrencies are based on a set of technologies commonly 
referred to as blockchain technology.  The potential effect of blockchain technology on 
institutional economics is profound.  Already, blockchain technology-based applications in supply 
chain management, marketing, and finance are decentralizing and streamlining vital institutional 
functions.  In this paper, we examine the economics of blockchain technologies as it pertains to 
transaction costs in startups.  We draw upon the theory of transaction cost economics and the 
transactional nature of blockchain technology to propose a model to demonstrate how and why 
blockchain technology based applications are effective in some areas but not in others.  We then 
apply the model to demonstrate how blockchain technology can be used to overcome many 
problems inherent in startup financing.  For example, information asymmetry and transaction costs 
involved with matching an entrepreneur with an investor and the terms of the financing deal are 
some of the fundamental issues in entrepreneurial financing.  We explain how a financing system 
based on blockchain technology can ameliorate the problems and lead to a more effective and 
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 Technologies based on the blockchain platform have the potential to disrupt various 
industries (de Soto, 2017; Potts et al., 2017).  We are already witnessing the disruptive effects of  
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, on  the ongoing revolution in banking, online 
currency markets, and online buying-selling of goods and services (Tapscott and Tapscott, 2016).  
The decentralized nature of blockchain technology in conjunction with the trust generation through 
sophisticated algorithms, absence of any middlemen, and negligible counterparty risk has far-
reaching implications for institutional economics (Evans, 2014, Narayanan et al., 2016).  However, 
while there has been research on various aspects of cryptocurrencies and specific applications of 
blockchain technology, studies exploring the economic and entrepreneurial side of blockchain 
technologies are limited1 (Catalini and Gans, 2016).  According to the limited extent  research, 
blockchain technologies represent several entrepreneurship opportunities in areas of unbanked 
practices(Larios-Hernández, 2017), new business models (Morkunas et al., 2019), and startup 
financing (Ante et al., 2018; Akbarpour, 2019; Tumasjan et al., 2019).  Given the relevance of 
blockchain technologies in entrepreneurship and the anecdotal evidence about the advantages and 
disadvantages of implementing cryptocurrencies for startups financing, the ongoing academic 
debate highlights the need for exploring both themes using robust conceptual and methodological 
                                                            
1 During the last five years, the research on blockchain has been growing.  According to the Web of Science, 1351 papers associated 
with blockchain technologies have been published from 2015 to 2019.  Concretely, linked with business (51), economics (29), 
management (44), and finance (76). However, on the theme that we focus in  this manuscript (startup finance) only 9 papers have 
been published and mostly in 2019.   
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approaches.  Inspired by these academic debates, this paper examines the blockchain technologies 
and startup finance through the lens of the institutional economics approach (i.e, transaction costs).  
Transaction cost economics has played a dominant role in shaping the scholarly debate on 
economics of institutions for decades.  Ronald Coase  was the first researcher to analyze how transactions 
costs influence  organization of firm and markets  in his seminal paper on “The Nature of The Firm”.  
Kenneth Arrow further extended the argument in highly influential  1969 paper on the organization of 
economic activity by explaining the role of transaction costs in market failures and intermediate product 
contracting.  Williamson (1971, 1981, and 2002) contributed to the argument by applying transaction cost 
economics to explain various aspects of market and organization economics such as vertical integration, 
governance, and market coordination and failures.  In the digital era, we examine the economic decisions 
that a startup understakes regarding their search for cryptocurrency as an alternative funding mechanism.  
Concretely, the theory and predictions of transaction cost economics model help to inform how blockchain 
technologies can influence a firm’s organizational decisions because of their ability to decentralize 
(democratize) and reduce transactions costs (economically and socially) thereby creating trust in the 
counterparties (Chen et al., 2018).  We assume, technologies based on the blockchain architecture has a 
potential to revolutionize transaction costs, both in terms of cost and convenience.  We utilize the 
framework to develop a better understanding of various industries and institutional functions in the 
economy.  In this regard, this paper focuses on the area of entrepreneurial finance where the information 
asymmetries (between an entrepreneur and an investor) and transaction costs associated with startup 
financing are high and often unsurmountable.  More concretely, we explain how blockchain technologies 
inherent transaction-based decentralized system can alleviate these problems in the area of startup 
financing.  
Our paper makes significant contribution to the entrepreneurship, finance and technology 
literature.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to explain the transactional costs of 
implementing blockchains technologies for startup financing.  Specifically, this is the first study 
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to explore the ability of blockchains to reduce and provide alternative to activities that involve 
transaction costs.  Treiblmaier (2018) utilized transaction cost economics model to analyze the 
potential impact of blockchain technology on supply chain management.  However, in the present 
study we complement Treiblmaier (2018) by focusing on the startup financing and how the 
blockchain technology applications in the field of startup financing can be better understood using 
transaction cost economics.  Further, in utilizing a transaction cost economics model to explain the 
utility of blockchain technologies, the study explains how blockchain’s ability to reduce and 
manage transactions is the driving force behind its applicability in the broader institutional 
framework.  Moreover, the proposed theoretical framework highlights applications of blockchain 
technology to address inherent inefficiencies and problems  in the traditional entrepreneurial 
financing model.  As a result, the paper provides practical examples of the efficacy of this novel 
framework by applying it to analyze how blockchain technology can be applied to raise startup 
financing.  We explain how the blockchain technology’s ability to generate trust, its decentralized 
nature, and the capacity for tokenization help startups seeking financing. 
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief description of 
transaction cost economics to familiarize readers about the main theoretical framework.  In the 
third section, we offer a brief description of the literature on blockchain technologies and startup 
financing.  In the proposed theoretical model, we provide arguments and logical reasoning 
regarding the transactional costs and blockchain technology applied to startup financing.  In the 
discussion section, we explain how our model compares to findings and arguments advanced in 
the extant literature.  We conclude our paper after providing future research directions . 
 




 Transaction cost economics has been a dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of 
management and organization (Chiles and McMackin, 1996; David and Han, 2004; Williamson, 
2008) since the publication of Williamson’s seminal book, Market and Hierarchies (Williamson, 
1975).  The theory attempts to explain the nature of the firm and predicts why certain activities are 
performed inside the firm versus the neoclassical economics view of the activities undertaken by 
a free market system or a hybrid market arrangement, where parties to the transaction are 
interdependent in a nontrivial way (David and Han, 2004).  The core of the transaction cost 
economics theory is ‘transactions’ and ‘costs’.  The transaction refers to the transfer of a unit of 
goods or service, while costs refer to the sum of associated monetary and non-monetary values 
involved in facilitating the transfer.  The latter is also referred to as the transaction costs. The 
transaction costs arise from environmental uncertainty, bounded rationality, opportunism, and 
specificity of assets.  Environmental uncertainty and bounded rationality lead to incomplete 
contracts and subpar decision making.  These two factors make it impossible to have 
informationally complete contracts as proposed by neoclassical economics.  In the absence of 
complete contracts, there is a probability that either party to the transaction can indulge in 
opportunism and extract economic rents (Williamson, 2008).  Thus, trust in transactions becomes 
a vital part of the relation between the parties.  Blockchain technology has potential to overcome 
the trust problem by using mathematical algorithms and decentralized networks.  
Another factor contributing to the transaction costs is asset specificity.  If an asset cannot 
be easily redeployed for alternative uses, it is said to have a high asset specificity, while an asset 
that can be utilized for alternative purposes has low asset specificity.  For example, if a supplier 
commits to undertake substantial investments in assets that are used to manufacture a good for a 
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specific buyer.  The supplier has caused their assets to be specific to the buyer.  In this case, if the 
supplier fails to meet the buyer’s demands, the supplier allows the buyer to pay less to not lose the 

















Figure 1: Traditional Transaction Cost Model 
3. Literature Review 
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and related costs.  The formal theory of Transaction Cos Economics (TCE) was developed in the 
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1960s and the 1970s drawing on insights offered by Coase’s paper (Williamson, 1973, 1975, 
1985).  Over the last five decades, TCE has emerged as one of the primary theories to explain the 
nature of a firm and is additionally seen as a theory of management and governance (Chandler, 
1990; Conner, 1991: Williamson, 1979, 1984).  TCE examines complex transactions, undertaken 
by economic agents who are rational and indulge in opportunism, involving assets that are not easy 
to redeploy in an uncertain environment (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2000; Williamson, 1981).  
In literature, the predictive validity of the theory has received mixed empirical support (David 
and Han, 2004).  In aggregating empirical findings in the literature, David and Han (2004) find 
only 47 percent of studies published in premier business academic journals had findings consistent 
with TCE’s prediction.  This finding is consistent with arguments advanced by leading business 
scholars regarding TCE (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996; Robins, 1987).  
However, arguments and findings in support of TCE are equally strong (Mahoney, 1992; Shelanski 
and Klein, 1995) with scholars attributing inconsistent findings in the literature to 
operationalization or sampling issues (David and Han, 2004).  Further, as a framework, TCE has 
recently contributed to robust improvements in theory development (Tsang, 2006).  
In entrepreneurial finance, a high environmental uncertainity and a high information 
asymmerty between entrepreneur(s) and investors significanty enhances transaction costs involved 
in financing (e.g., Mahto et al., 2018 a, Mahto et al., 2018b).  The transaction costs involved in 
startup financing is so high that many entrepreneurial ecosystems have multiple redundant entities 
competiting with each other, thereby leading to significant inefficiencies in the system (Mahto et 
al., 2018a).  Many investors, especially Venture Capitalists (VCs), design their own systems and 
practices to deal with high information asymmetry and uncertainties inherent in the entrepreneurial 
finance ecosystem (e.g., Mahto and Khanin, 2013).  For example, most VCs and angel investors 
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specialize in only certain industries, while some VCs prioritize either entrepreneurs or venture 
quality in their investment decision (Khanin et al., 2008).  Further, entrepreneurs reduce their 
transaction cost by preferring investment from reputable VCs even when it comes with significant 
cost (Mahto et al.,2018b).  Even with prevalent strategies for dealing with high transaction costs, 
some investors (e.g., VCs) further refine their strategies by focusing on specific characteristics of 
either entrepreneur (e.g., reputation) or their venture ( Mahto and Khanin, 2013).  We believe the 
blockchain technology might be useful in reducing the hurdles in this environment.  
In this paper, the blockchain technology is explained using the TCE perspective. Blockchain 
technology was initially developed to record transactions of encrypted digital currency (i.e., 
Bitcoin) (Nakamoto, 2008).  Several researchers have shown how the underlying blockchain 
technology empowering various cryptocurrencies should be the focus of study (Tapscott and 
Tapscott, 2016; Walport, 2016).  Blockchain technology allows for a distributed and non-
centralized secure ledger (Walport, 2016).  Blockchain records transactions in an encrypted, 
secure, verifiable, decentralized, and low-cost way (Catalini and Gans, 2016; Schatsky and 
Muraskin, 2015) thus minimizing the verification costs and the networking costs.  Thereby, 
making the blockchain-based transactions more cost-efficient.  
They use these two costs to show that the resulting digital marketplaces are characterized by 
increased competition, lower barriers to entry, lower privacy risk, and decentralization of power.  
Previous studies have examined the application of blockchain technologies to various financial, 
banking, crowdfunding campaigns, supply chain, and other business functions (Belleflamme, 
Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2014; Diedrich, 2016; Mollick, 2014).  This paper examines the 
application of blockchain technology to the process of startup financing and explains how the TCE 
























Figure 2: Modified Transaction Cost Model with Blockchain Technology 
 
4. Theoretical Model 
Firm goal - Minimize transaction 
costs associated with resource 

















reduces uncertainty by 
completing transactions 
quickly and without the 
need of third-party 
intermediaries  
Blockchain Technology 
reduces opportunism by 
having a verifiable smart 
contract in place  
Blockchain Technology 
builds trust in the network 
by ensuring secure 
verifiable transactions. The 
decentralized nature of the 
technology does not 
require any trust in a 
central authority.   
Blockchain 
Technology assigns 




We first breakdown the transaction costs into its components to provide a better understanding 
of how blockchain technology impacts these transactional costs.  Primarily, transaction costs can 
be divided into Search Costs, Verification Costs, Transportation Costs, Tracking Costs, 
Replication Costs, and Contractual Costs.  Search costs are incurred when one party to the 
transaction looks for the counterparty.  Verification costs are incurred to verify that the shortlisted 
counterparty has the wherewithal to complete the transaction.  Transportation costs are incurred 
when the exchanged good or service changes hands.  Tracking costs are incurred to track the 
transaction and to track the moment of the good or service to its designated place.  Finally, 
replication and contractual costs are incurred to check the contract in the future and to ensure its 
validity for future actions.  Blockchain technologies can contribute to the reduction in each of these 
costs and further reduces the environmental uncertainty by its unique approach to ensure trust. 
In Figure 2, we present our model to show how blockchain technology at each critical juncture 
can improve  the transactions costs by building a better trust mechanism in the system, by 
providing means to verify transacations, and reduce costs related to intermediaries.  Blockchain 
Technology builds trust in the network by ensuring a secure verifiable transaction.  The 
decentralized nature of the technology does not require any trust in a central authority.  In the 
system  opportunism can be reduced through tokenization by having a verifiable smart contract in 
place.  At the completion of the smart conditions the asset can be assigned to the receiver.  Since 
the underlying structures in blockchain technology provide all the above services the need for a 
third party intermediary to act as an escrow or guarantor of services and transactions is eliminated.   
To illustrate how blockchain technologies can influence each of the costs and how transactions 
are done differently under the blockchain model we consider a simple example of a transaction 
where the money is sent from one country to another country.  The sender in Country A wants to 
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send money to a receiver in Country B.  The sender initiates the transfer through their bank in 
Country A.  The bank gets in touch with Country A’s correspondent bank.  Country A’s 
correspondent bank gets in touch with Country B’s correspondent bank which in turn is linked to 
Country B’s bank that the Receiver has an account in the bank.  In each stage, the costs are 
incurred, and the exchange rate adds risks to the final amount of that the receiver receives.  These 
costs are not finalized until the payment is received by Country B receiver’s bank and can be as 
high as 10% and take several days to complete.  The same transaction can be seamlessly done 
through blockchain.  For example, through bank’s enterprise blockchain system, the money can 
be transferred almost instantly from sender’s bank to receiver’s bank without the need of any 
intermediaries or third-party providers.  This process does not only reduce the cost of the 
transaction but also mitigates the uncertainty (of the exchange rate risk) by significantly reducing 
the time it takes to complete the transaction.  Various banks and even IMF are exploring how 
blockchain technology can be used to make cross border remittances efficient.  Various apps such 
as Power Circle App claim to allow its users to transfer money overseas through its platform built 
on the blockchain technology. 
Blockchain technology ensures various advantages over the existing ledger technologies used 
for transactions.  Blockchain, by its construction, records the history of all transactions and 
provides the same copy to all users in the network.  The process is democratic as all users in the 
network agree on the rules governing the blockchain.  The transactions are secured using 
cryptography, digital keys, and digital signatures.  Many blockchains allow the network to be 
segmented and be private by allowing only specific digital signatures to access a portion of the 
blockchain or even just one transaction.  The records of transactions are updated quickly, and once 
the block is assigned to the blockchain it cannot be modified.  It is thus providing a permanent 
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tamper-proof record of the transaction.  Blockchain technology allows the creation of smart 
contracts that can be used to transact various functions that a company or market undertakes. 
 
4.1. Smart Contracts Built on Blockchain Technology 
 
While blockchain technology was initially developed to support Bitcoin, a digital currency, 
soon developers started extending the capabilities of the blockchain technology.  The digital 
currency allowed for the creation of general-purpose platforms, digital tokens, and decentralized 
smart digital applications.  Smart tokens are digital artifacts that are used to tokenize scarce assets 
and subject to certain conditionsbeing fulfilled the smart contract housed in the token assigns the 
ownership of the underlying asset.  The digital tokens can be created on top of a blockchain and 
can represent a wide range of assets such as currencies, equity stakes, and preorders.  Castellanos 
et. al. (2017) provide an exampe where using tokens based on the Ethereum Blockchain and Smart 
Contracts, one can sell tokenized GoOs to consumers willing to subsidize renewable energy 
producers.  Chen (2018) also states that blockchain technology has given innovators the capability 
of creating digital tokens to represent scarce assets, potentially reshaping the landscape of 
entrepreneurship and innovation.  Similarly, Tapscott and Tapscott (2016) provides various 
examplse of digital tokenization and smart contracts. The simple addition of tokenization within a 
blockchain has the potential to disrupt various functions within a firm such as supply chain, 
accounting, human resources, banking, and other digital transactions.  With tokenization, the cost 
reductions, trust, and decentralization can be applied to whole gamut of business functions.  We 




4.2. Blockchain Technology and Startup Financing 
 
Startups financing suffers from many of the costs discussed in transaction cost economics. 
Startups are new and upcoming private companies that operate in a dark world where information 
asymmetries between the startup and investors are enormous (Mahto et al., 2018a).  In order to 
deal with these uncertainties, the market has adopted various financing models such as VC model, 
angel investor model or hybrid models involving convertible debt and more recently crowdfunding 
models. Further, startups face the search costs of finding a suitable investor.  Different VC’s and 
angels specialize in different industries and phases of a startup and may not be a good fit for all 
startups(Khanin et al., 2008).  Other investors who may be willing to invest in the startup may not 
do so because of informational reasons (Cassar, 2004; Cotei and Farhat, 2017; Denis, 2004).  
Crowdfunding fills some of these gaps in the funding of innovative startups.  A typical startup 
often requires less than $100,000 in its initial stages (Kauffman Foundation, 2007).  
The traditional avenues of raising outside financing are the banks (debt), and angels or 
venture capitalists (equity or convertible debt) (Mahto et al.,  2018b).  Banks are reluctant to fund 
startups because they lack collateral and credit, however established SME often fair better.  A 
startup typically has no assets to collateralize and has no history of accounts receivables or 
accounts payables.  VCs are constrained by general partners’ time devoted to grooming and 
developing their portfolio companies (Denis, 2004; Gompers and Lerner 2004; Sahlman, 1990;  
Zider, 1998).  Thus, VCs rarely make investments under $1 million.  In this sense, angel investors 
have historically filled this gap with a concentration in certain cities.  Also, entrepreneurs are often 
unwilling to accept financing from angel investors due to aggressive equity negotiation tactics 
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employed by them.  Thus, crowdfunding platforms like Kickstarter, Gofundme, and Indiegogo 
have become popular alternatives for entrepreneurs in recent years.  
The crowdfunding platforms complement the blockchain technologies in reducing various 
costs associated with startup financing.  Typically, in a crowdfunding campaign, entrepreneurs or 
companies seeking to tap customers and raise financial resources offer customers or audience of 
the platform access to their idea or products.  In order to engage the audience and achieve success 
for their funding campaign, entrepreneurs employ marketing tactics that utilize multiple modes of 
communicating their messages (e.g., written, oral and video).  In the popular crowdfunding 
models, potential customers and /or investors can decide to financially support the development of 
a product or idea by pledging a varying level of financial support that can range $1 to thousands 
of dollars.  If the promoter of the idea can achieve the set funding goal, then the funds flow from 
investors to them minus the 3-5% fees charged by the crowdfunding platform.The investors and 
or potential consumers who support the product or service take an active interest in the 
development of the product or service.  Active two-way communication between promoters and 
investors helps investors to understand the product while at the same time it helps promoters to 
understand the consumer needs.  The developers also give frequent updates on the progress and 
development of the product or service and investors can give feedback and suggestions at each 
stage.  While many startups avail the benefits of crowdfunding still the potential is not fully 
realized because of the absence of ownership stake and monitoring.  
Blockchain technology helps to overcome these limitations.  A startup project or product 
development can be structured such that the underlying product or project is tokenized using 
blockchain.  These tokens are sold to the public, for example, through crowdfunding campaigns. 
These tokens can represent pre-orders where the customer will get the product when the project is 
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funded, or they can even represent an equity stake in the company.  The equity stakes are possible 
now with the implementation of the 2012 “Jumpstart our Business Startups (JOBS)” act in the 
United States (Goulding et al., 2013).  The act allows entrepreneurs and small business owners the 
flexibility to seek investment from the general public often in the form of Crowdfunding (Stemler, 
2013).  The new law allows startups to offer securities such as stocks and bonds directly to 
consumers as long as they meet specific regulatory requirements (Martin, 2012).  Hence the tokens 
can now legally represent an ownership stake in the company. Further, these digital tokens can be 
governed by smart contracts that trigger specific actions when certain conditions are met.  For 
example, successful completion of a stage in the development of the product or a project can signal 
a reduction in uncertainty and increase the value of the tokens.  It is thus incentivizing early 
investors by allowing them to trade their initial investment for a profit.  Such trades have not been 
possible in traditional crowdfunding campaigns.  The smart contracts can even be something as 
simple as token acting as a pre-order, and when the development and manufacturing are complete 
the smart contract is triggered, and each token holder is shipped the finished product. The trade of 
tokens also helps the startup to gauge the interest and support of investors just as stock price 
movements help the management of a public company.  Further, these tokens can allow the 
investors to monitor and control the progress of a startup and take corrective action in ways similar 
to the board of directors to do in a public company.  Thus, we see that blockchain technology, not 
only overcomes various transaction costs associated with startup financing, but also empowers 
both startups and investors to complete the financing and development of the startup more 






 Blockchain technology is a disruptive innovation underlying cryptocurrencies, such as 
Bitcoin and Ethereum.  The technology has received significant attention from practitioners (for 
use in optimizing various market and organization functions) and academics (for research).  The 
technology has been utilized extensively for not only creating many new cryptocurrencies but also 
for financial services, such as digital assets and online payments (Foroglou and Tsilidou,2015; 
Peters et al., 2015).  The revolutionary technology has potential to significantly alter many other 
areas that include internet of things (IoT) (Zhang and Wen, 2015), security (Noyes, 2016), supply 
chain management (Tian, 2016), and delivery of services (Akins et al., 2014).  
 Entrepreneurial finance is an inefficient ecosystem (Mahto et al., 2018a), where transaction 
costs are quite high.  The prevailing inefficient system has also resulted in the system where 
locational advantages are prohibiting the development of entrepreneurial firms in areas lacking 
availability of a strong network of financial stakeholders, such as banks, angels, and VCs.  The 
ecosystem inefficiency is also partially due to specialization of financial intermediaries, such as 
angels and VCs, who specialize in a specific industry or a specific stage of the entrepreneurial 
venture.  We believe the entrepreneurial ecosystem is fertile for application of blockchain 
technology to address some of the inherent inefficiencies.  The distributed and cost-efficient 
characteristics of the technology will facilitate transactions in the system, where the probability of 
opportunism and uncertainty is low, and trust and security are high.  The blockchain technology 
can significantly reduce the transaction costs for stakeholders in the entrepreneurial ecosystem, 
such as entrepreneurs, angels, and VCs.  The primary cost reduction is achieved by reducing search 
cost and eliminating third-party intermediary in the system.  Blockchain technology can address 
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many of the issues hindering the development of a robust entrepreneurial ecosystem at the local 
level for economic development (Mahto et al., 2018b; Mahto and McDowell, 2018). 
 
5.1. Limitations  
 
In this paper, our primary goal was to examine blockchain technology through a theoretical lens 
of TCE.  As the blockchain technology is still in its nascent stage our study suffers from limitations 
of current state of blockchain technology and its implementation in the business organizations.  As 
noted economist Nouriel Roubini has written: “As for the underlying blockchain technology, there 
are still massive obstacles standing in its way, even if it has more potential than cryptocurrencies. 
Chief among them is that it lacks the kind of basic common and universal protocols that made the 
Internet universally accessible (TCP-IP, HTML, and so forth). More fundamentally, its promise of 
decentralized transactions with no intermediary authority amounts to an untested, Utopian 
pipedream. No wonder blockchain is ranked close to the peak of the hype cycle of technologies 
with inflated expectations.”  Some other concerns that yet need to be addressed are that current 
state of  blockchain technology is very enrgy intensive.  Many of the nodes in a blockchain are 
needlessly repeating calculations done be other nodes needlessly slowing down the whole system.  
In current state blockchain technology is sluggish in executing transactions as the user base of 
people using blockchain technologies grow it is expected that the trasnactions will take even longer 
time.  However, with rapid advances in technology we hope that speed issues will become less 
negative.  The integeration with legacy systems is a substantial hurdle that needs to be addressed 




5.2. Future Research Directions 
 The model and arguments in this study are conceptual and require empirical assessments 
before application.  We encourage entrepreneurship scholars to undertake studies to assess whether 
transaction cost minimization is a factor in investment decision made by system stakeholders.  The 
two different approaches in studying TCE in entrepreneurial ecosystems are an evolutionary 
approach (population ecology) and managerial decision approach (firm governance).  We believe 
the evolutionary approach is more appropriate for investigating blockchain technology in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem.  In evolutionary approach, scholars can examine whether cost 
minimization is associated with survival of stakeholders in the system.  If the findings are 
confirmed empirically, then the scholars can further probe the financial system using various 
attributes of blockchain technology (e.g., trust and uncertainty) to see if the other areas of the 
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